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ABSTRACT

This study argues that former West German Foreign Minister HansDietrich Genscher's use of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in
Europe to promote pan-European unity formed a primary and consistent tenet of
his foreign policy that he rarely subordinated for pragmatic reasons. The paper
examines three case studies: the aftermath of the 1980-87 INF debate in West
Germany, Genscher's initial reaction to Mikhail Gorbachev, and the reunification
of Germany. The study examines the role the CSCE played in each of the
aforementioned instances and compares Genscher's actions with his official
rhetoric. The study then assesses the extent to which Genscher used the CSCE
to foster his vision of a unified Europe and whether he consistently stuck to his
goal. The examination suggests that Genscher used the CSCE to actively
pursue pan-European unity without compromising German interests and his
role as Foreign Minister of West Germany.

v

HANS-DIETRICH GENSCHER AND THE CSCE PROCESS

Introduction

On May 1 7 ,1 9 9 2 Hans-Dietrich Genscher retired from his position as
Germany’s foreign minister. Genscher had held this post for eighteen years, a
term of office that spanned both Christian Democratic and Social Democratic
German governments and all of West Germany’s membership in the United
Nations. Despite the length of Genscher’s term of office and the changing
philosophies of the governing coalitions under which he served, Genscher’s
foreign policy exhibited remarkable continuity. Appointed foreign minister on
May 17, 1974, Genscher’s ascension to power coincided with the negotiation
and conclusion of the Helsinki accords, a series of agreements designed to
foster peaceful change in Europe through better relations between the two
superpowers and their allies, and the creation of the Conference on Security
and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), a multilateral forum designed to help close
the rift between eastern and western Europe. Both of these foreign policy
experiences profoundly affected Genscher and his view of European unity.
From that point on, Genscher made the pursuit of pan-European unity one of
his primary foreign policy objectives. Genscher defined his vision of panEuropean unity as the bringing together of East and West Europe despite its
post-war division by the superpowers.
To what extent was the use of the CSCE to foster a pan-Europeanism a
main tenet of Genscher’s actual foreign policy? His critics have said that his
principled evocation of a new Europe was somewhat lacking. His political
generosity towards eastern Europe has been derided as appeasement.
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Genscher himself has often been described as a master tactician, a label that
has haunted him throughout his career, and he was never able to throw off a
reputation for “putting tactics before principles.”1 Genscher’s politics were at
times described as “above all - some say at any cost - about compromise.”
Helmut Schmidt, the former Chancellor of West Germany, whom Genscher
helped depose by switching his small, centrist, Free Democratic Party’s
allegiance to Helmut Kohl’s CDU-CSU, described him as a “tactician without a
strategy.” Genscher has often been accused of paying lip service to his ideals
while remaining secure in his policies by avoiding hard choices.2 This
pragmatism is often seen as a reflection of the FDP’s effort to play “kingmaker”
in the German party system, providing the CDU-CSU or the SPD with a
coalition partner, yet winning votes by acting as a “corrective” to these larger
parties.
Genscher’s supporters reject the accusation that his policies lacked
principle. They point to the success his determination to keep open a dialogue
with the east and the Soviet Union has engendered: a more democratic eastern
Europe and the reunification of Germany.3 Which view is correct? Did
Genscher the master tactician hold sway over Genscher the utopian? Did the
foreign minister compromise his pan-European vision in order to achieve a
consensus on his policies and avoid controversy?
This paper argues that foreign minister Genscher used the CSCE to
foster his pan-European vision, and furthermore, this pan-European vision
formed a primary and consistent tenet of his foreign policy that he rarely, if ever,

1 David Marsh, “A gap at the high table of power play,” The Financial Times, April 28,1992,
P-2.
2 “Genscher’s last act,” The Economist, May 2,1992, p.58.
3 Ibid., p.58.
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subordinated for pragmatic reasons. The paper will proceed by examining three
case studies: the aftermath of the 1980-87 INF debate in West Germany,
Genscher’s initial reaction to Mikhail Gorbachev, and the reunification of
Germany. The paper will examine the role the CSCE played in each of the
cases and compare foreign minister Genscher’s actions with his official rhetoric.
The paper will then assess the extent to which Genscher used the CSCE to
foster his vision of a unified Europe and whether or not he consistently stuck to
his goal.

C H A P TE R I
G enscher's Pan-European Foreign Policy and the CSCE Process

Genscher has stated on dozens, possibly hundreds, of occasions the
importance he attaches to bringing eastern and western Europe closer together.
In a 1982 article published in Foreign Affairs, Genscher described the central
elements of his foreign policy towards eastern Europe:
The central element of the...German policy toward the east, is the aim to
establish and preserve a modus vivendi in a divided Europe-one which
casts aside the basic conflict between East and West that cannot be
resolved within the foreseeable future and which permits bridges of
dialogue and cooperation to be spanned over the rifts formed by different
philosophies and long-term goals. In this way it is intended, in the short
term, to mitigate the effects of the division of Europe and, in the long term,
to foster an evolutionary process in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union
itself, leading to greater freedom for people in the East and to a genuine
peace order in Europe.4

Genscher’s ultimate plan for Europe was its transformation into a
cooperative entity with common goals, a concept he often referred to as a
“common European house.” Genscher emphasized that his favorite vehicle for
pursuing his pan-European vision was the CSCE. Consistently, throughout his
term in office, Genscher stressed the importance of the CSCE as an absolutely
necessary and effective device for achieving European unity:

4 Hans-Dietrich Genscher, “Toward an Overall Western Strategy for Peace, Freedom and
Progress,” in Foreign Affairs Fall 1982, Vol.61, No.1, p.43-44.
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...the CSCE final act has given the West an important instrument for a
dynamic policy of detente.... it gives us political legitimization for the
realization of human rights, for peaceful change and for the gradual
overcoming of the division of Europe.5

For Genscher, the CSCE was an instrument for reshaping Europe that
provided a “dramatic, comprehensive forum which does not take the east-west
confrontation for granted, but seeks to break it down.”6 Every nation
participating in the CSCE process has an equal voice in its proceedings.
Consequently, through its process of consensus building and constant
deliberation, the CSCE appeared to provide Genscher with an ideal vehicle
with which to pursue his vision of European unity.
The CSCE process has its roots in the Helsinki Final Act. The original
Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe took place in Geneva from
1973 to 1975. The document that ultimately arose out of this conference
became known as the “Helsinki Accords.” Originally slated to take place only
through 1973-75, the Geneva meetings gradually grew into a series of
diplomatic roundtables which became known as the CSCE process. The
process included, and continues to include, the U.S., Canada, and the countries
of eastern and western Europe.
Immediately after its founding the CSCE became both an instrument of
detente and a forum for East-West confrontation. It was dominated by
conflicting objectives. The East, namely the Soviet Union, sought to use the
CSCE to legitimize its presence in Europe, whereas the West attempted to use
the conference to wrangle commitments on human rights, and freedom of

5 Ibid., p.57.
6 Hans-Dietrich Genscher, “Perspektiven einer europaischen Friedensordnung, Vienna,
August 27, 1986, Bulletin 96 (Bundespresseamt, August 29, 1986), p.807-809.
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movement, people and ideas out of the East. The end result of two years of
difficult and complex negotiations between East and West was the Helsinki
Final Act. This document was not legally binding beyond the fact that the
participating nations stated their determination to implement its provisions. The
Final Act consisted of four sections or “baskets” which dealt with various fields of
cooperation between the two blocs. The first basket contained a subsection
entitled the Declaration on Principles. It was this section of the document which
proved to be the most important in later years. The declaration included ten
principles:
1. Sovereign equality, respect for the rights inherent in sovereignty;
2. Refraining from the threat or use of force;
3. Inviolability of frontiers;
4. Territorial integrity of states;
5. Peaceful settlement of disputes;
6. Nonintervention in internal affairs;
7. Respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, including the freedom
of thought, conscience, religion, or belief;
8. Equal rights and self-determination of peoples;
9. Cooperation among states; and
10. Fulfillment in good faith of obligations under international law.7

Critics of the CSCE process saw it simply as an ersatz peace treaty for
World War II. The Helsinki Agreement was derided as a non-binding document
that served only to legitimize Soviet domination of eastern Europe. President
Gerald Ford was criticized heavily in the United States for signing a document
many considered to be without substance. John J. Moresca, a member of the
U.S. delegation in Geneva and Helsinki, held the following point of view about
the CSCE process:

7 Stefan Lehne, The CSCE in the 199Q’s: Common European House or Potemkin Village?
(Wien: Braumueller, 1991), p.2.
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The signing of the Final Act...resolved very little in any specific sense;
rather, it preserved more or less intact the various territorial and
ideological disagreements, contradictions, and inconsistencies that have
made up the postwar equilibrium in Europe.8
Despite such skepticism on the part of some participants and observers,
the ten principles outlined in Basket I formed the basis for Genscher’s argument
that the CSCE could be a dynamic tool to foster his pan-European vision. In
particular, principles seven through ten formed the core of his plan for an active
western detente policy.
It was intended that it [the declaration of principles] would contribute to
increasing the personal liberty of the individual in the East, and to help
make it possible for people on both sides of the border between East and
West to come together again.9
The mere fact that the East was a signatory to these principles demonstrated to
Genscher the East's belief that these topics should be an essential part of the
East-West cooperative dialogue. This dialogue “gives us the political
legitimization to call for...peaceful change and for the gradual overcoming of the
division of Europe.”10 After Helsinki, Genscher contended that the discussion of
peaceful change in the East was now a permanent part of East-West relations.
Genscher thus saw the CSCE as serving broader purposes than the
realization of human rights in the East. The CSCE came to represent for
Genscher a chance to institutionalize detente. It offered an important vehicle for
keeping East-West detente intact while Genscher was forced to make difficult
and unpopular (for the East) foreign and domestic policy decisions. The CSCE
8 John J. Moresca, To Helsinki The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe 19731975 (Duke University Press: Durham, 1987), p.4.
9 Hans-Dietrich Genscher, “Toward an Overall Western Strategy for Peace, Freedom and
Progress,” p.57.
10 Ibid., p.57.

could play an important role in Genscher’s diplomacy during the INF missile
debate in West Germany (a potential disaster for East-West relations),
Genscher’s initial overtures towards Mikhail Gorbachev (Genscher was the first
to actively encourage trusting the Soviet General Secretary), and the process of
German reunification (a potentially destabilizing occurrence for both East and

C H A P TE R II
The INF Debate

From its inception, the FRG’s approach to security policy had been one of
reliance on American nuclear forces as a deterrent against possible Soviet
aggression. Despite some initial protest, this unwavering dependence upon the
American nuclear deterrent enjoyed widespread societal and governmental
approval. However, after NATO’s 1967 Harmel Report reliance upon
deterrence became increasingly coupled with the policy of detente towards the
East.11 The inherent tension between a policy that emphasizes preparedness
for devastating war (deterrence) and one that emphasizes arms control
dialogue, increasing East-West openness and confidence-building activities
(detente) did not tangibly come to the forefront of German politics until Helmut
Schmidt’s Chancellorship (1974-1982). Reliance on the two track security
policy (deterrence + detente = security) outlined in NATO’s 1967 Harmel Report
began to unravel during the INF12 (Intermediate Nuclear Forces) debate that
occurred during Schmidt’s Chancellorship.13
Helmut Schmidt began to create a more assertive role for the FRG in the

11 The Harmel Report was a strategy paper issued by the NATO organization in December of
1967. This report defined a long lasting NATO consensus: diplomacy and negotiations (detente)
were a necessary complement to a policy of deterrence based on nuclear weapons.
12 INF forces are medium -range nuclear weapons based in Western Europe that are able to
strike targets in the western parts of the Soviet Union. The INF debate centered around the
deployment of 108 single-warhead Pershing II missiles in West Germany.
13 Thomas Risse-Kappen, The Zero Option INF. West Germany, and Arms Control (Westview
Press: Boulder, 1988), p. 21.

10

11
late 1970’s. Disenchanted with the tenor of American leadership and upset by
what he perceived to be a U.S. lack of concern for West Germany's strategic
position, Schmidt began to draw attention to the disparity between the INF
forces of the Warsaw Pact and those of NATO. Schmidt suggested that decisive
steps be taken to remedy the growing imbalance of forces. NATO’s response
was the so called "double-track" decision of 1979. This decision presupposed
negotiation with the Soviet Union to persuade them to remove their SS-20
>

intermediate range nuclear missiles from Eastern Europe. Coupled with these
actions was the threat that if the Soviet negotiations failed, NATO would deploy
similar intermediate range missiles in Western Europe (most notably West
Germany).14
By pursuing these nuclear weapons initiatives Helmut Schmidt had given
primacy to two central goals of West German security policy: fostering and
maintaining a credible deterrent based on an alliance with the West and the
prevention of American “decoupling.” During Helmut Schmidt’s tenure, these
goals appeared to take precedence over the pursuit of detente. Schmidt’s
prominent leadership role did not give Genscher much room for maneuver with
his detente policies, certainly not on the scale he began to enjoy from 1983
onwards.15 However, Genscher and Schmidt were both proponents of the
stationing of NATO missiles on German soil.
The initial NATO twin track INF proposal was met with silence by the
Soviet Union. The primary stumbling block to the early negotiations had been
NATO insistence on the “zero option": the notion of forgoing deployment of
Pershing II and cruise missiles altogether in return for acceptable Soviet
14 Michael R. Lucas, The Western Alliance after INF. Redefining U.S. Policy toward Europe
and the Soviet Union (Lynne Rienner: Boulder, 1990), p.11.
15 Emil J. Kirchner, “Genscher and What Lies Behind Genscherism,” West European Politics,
Volume 13, April 1990 #2, p. 163.
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concessions. The zero option had been debated both within Germany and
NATO and differing zero options had been proposed. Chancellor Schmidt
favored a European zero option, i.e., the West would agree not to deploy any
INF missiles provided the Soviet Union withdrew all of its SS-20 missiles that
were within striking distance of Western Europe.16
Genscher’s FDP had also committed itself to a zero option at its party
conference in Freiburg in June 1980. The party program stated:
The FDP will do everything in its power to ensure that the negotiation
offer made to the Warsaw Pact and coupled to NATO’s modernization
decision receives vigorous support. Our aim must be total renunciation
of the production and basing of medium-range nuclear weapons on both
sides.17
Unlike Schmidt, the FDP favored a global zero option: the total elimination of
Soviet IN Fs in return for Western non-deployment. The global zero option was
supported strongly by Genscher and later became the U.S. and NATO’s
negotiating position in the INF talks.
By presenting a global zero option proposal that many westerners felt
was essentially unacceptable to the Soviets, NATO was able to balance its
avowed goals of deterrence and arms control.18 However, the zero option
proposal also served to highlight the tension inherent in the FRG’s appeal for
nuclear arms on German soil to strengthen deterrence, and its simultaneous
appeal for arms control to make deterrence more palatable to the German
public.19
16 Thomas Risse-Kappen, p.80.
17 Wahlprogram der Freien Demokratischen Partei fur die Bundesfagswahlen am 5 .10.1980,
Freiburg, June 7, 1980, p. 12.
18 Michael R. Lucas, p. 10.
19 Clay Clemens, “Beyond INF.West Germany’s centre-right party and arms control in the
1990’s.” International Affairs. Vol. 65, No.1 (Winter 1988-89),p.59.

13
In early Winter 1983, after much debate within the German Bundestag,
the Pershing II missiles were installed in West Germany. The Soviet reaction to
their deployment was frigid. The day after the German Bundestag passed the
resolution supporting deployment, Soviet diplomats walked out of INF
negotiations in Geneva.

Soviet pronouncements aimed at the Kohl-Genscher

government were very hostile. Moscow described Bonn’s leaders in caustic
terms as German revanchists. Soviet relations with West Germany and the
West entered a second “ice age” with the USSR attempting to isolate the
Federal Republic internationally.
Yet with Mikhail Gorbachev’s rise to power and subsequent foreign
policy “peace offensive” towards the West, the zero option, much to the dismay
of the CDU-CSU leaders, gained credibility as a realistic arms control option.
Gorbachev broke the impasse that existed under the Brezhnev regime with his
January 15, 1986 proposal to free the world of nuclear weapons by the year
2000. The details of this proposal came very close to the Western zero option.
Gorbachev offered to trade away all the SS-20 missiles based in Europe for the
removal of the Pershing II and cruise missiles. For the first time a Soviet leader
had proposed a nuclear balance in Europe that meant parity between the U.S.
and the Soviet Union, not a balance seen as unfairly weighted towards the
USSR .20
The Reykjavik summit meeting between Ronald Reagan and Mikhail
Gorbachev represented a breakthrough for INF. While the summit meeting
brought no concrete achievements, both Reagan and Gorbachev had
negotiated far beyond their previous stances. In particular, Ronald Reagan had
gone far beyond what had been previously agreed upon by NATO alliance

20 Thomas Risse-Kappen, p. 110.
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members.21
The new developments caused a general sense of panic within the CDUCSU. The potential elimination of nuclear weapons from the theater of Europe
threatened the CDU-CSU’s long standing position on the need for long-range
nuclear missiles to strengthen the coupling of Europe’s defense to the U.S.. As
the broad outlines of the INF treaty became more apparent, so did the fears of
the conservative CDU-CSU members. Franz-Josef Strauss of the CSU
criticized the impending double-zero proposal by saying it would “naturally
mean a decoupling of America from Europe.”22 Strauss’s stance epitomized the
fears of many of the governing coalition’s members.

Genscher's Role
In 1980 Genscher supported NATO’s twin-track INF policy. Members of
Genscher’s political party, the FDP, challenged his security policies a number of
times in the early 1980’s. During the FDP’s 1981 party congress in Cologne
there was considerable resistance to Genscher’s support for the twin-track
decision and he was forced to threaten to resign if the party refused to support
him on INF.23 At the same time many FDP members found their coalition
partner, the SPD, to be drifting towards a position of anti-American, anti-NATO
neutralism. The neutralist tendencies of the SPD were even more unpalatable
to many FDP members than Genscher’s support for the twin-track decision. On
August 2 1 ,1 9 8 1 , Genscher spoke before the Free Democrats of the West
German state of Hessen. During that speech Genscher laid out his rationale for
supporting the deployment of INF. Genscher’s rationale struck the chords of
21 lbid.,p.116.
22 As quoted in the Washington Post, June 2,1987, p.1.
23 Thomas Risse-Kappen, p.76
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arms control, cooperation in the European Community, and the special German
responsibility for peace in Europe.24 In his speech, Genscher stressed the
importance of German support for NATO’s double-track decision. Genscher
stated that German support, or lack of support, for NATO's double-track decision
would indicate to the world whether Germany was allied with the West or was
drifting towards a dangerous neutralism. He stated:
W e will not forget, who our friend and ally is, and who is not our friend
and ally. W e do not stand equally distant from the USA and the Soviet
Union. Like the USA, we are a part of the West. One must say to those
whose talk arouses another impression: American troops are in West
Germany in order that free trade unions exist and Soviet troops are in
Poland to see to it that free trade unions there do not exist. That is the
difference.25
The debate over the INF issue began to undermine the FDP’s
partnership with the SPD severely in 1981. The FDP-SPD governing coalition
fell apart in 1982 when Genscher orchestrated the FDP’s switch to the CDUCSU. Genscher felt that this switch was necessary in order to guarantee
continuity in his foreign policy.26 While in power with the SPD, Genscher had
portrayed his party as a curb on the neutralist excesses of the Social
Democrats. After the switch in October of 1982 to a Christian-Liberal coalition,
Genscher and his party portrayed themselves as the liberal check on the
encroachment of the right-wing of the CDU-CSU. Ironically, it was during the
FDP’s partnership with the more conservative CDU-CSU coalition that the
detente aspect of the dual track policy became more prominent. While in power
with the CDU-CSU Genscher began to voice his concerns over the long-term
24 Jeffrey Herf, p. 158.
25 Hans-Dietrich Genscher, “Unsere Kinder und Enkelen die Schrecken des Krieges
ersparen,” Frankfurter Rundschau, September 8, 1982, p. 14.
26 Jeffrey Herf, p. 159.

16
viability of nuclear deterrence and strongly stated his desire to replace
deterrence with arms control and confidence building measures.
Throughout the INF debate Genscher continued the FRG’s participation
in the CSCE process despite the fact that between 1983 and 1986 the Soviet
Union sought to punish West Germany by isolating it internationally and
bypassing it in developing relations with the rest of Western Europe27 .
Genscher emphasized the role of the CSCE in an attempt to keep East-West
detente from collapsing during this difficult period.
This year, as in the past, the federal government has demonstrated its
interest in developing relations between East and West in Europe by
holding regular contacts with all its neighbors in the East. W e realize that
special importance attaches to our relations with the Soviet Union...The
political dialogue...needs to be further strengthened, particularly where
differences of opinion exist...both sides know that German-Soviet
relations must not be allowed to stagnate if developments between East
and West Europe are to proceed favorably 28
As an outgrowth of the CSCE process, the Conference on Confidenceand-Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe (CDE) held in
Stockholm, Sweden provided Genscher with an opportunity to pursue his new
detente thrust. The CDE grew out of a French proposal for a disarmament
conference at the 1984 CSCE meeting in Madrid. As superpower relations
deteriorated in the mid-1980’s, the prospect of a CDE conference became
increasingly desirable for both the West Europeans and the Soviets. Increased
Soviet deployment of SS-20 missiles, coupled with NATO’s double-track
response of further deploying INF while simultaneously attempting to engage in

27 Horst Teltschik, “Gorbachev’s Reform Policy and the Outlook for East-West Relations,”
AussenpoiWk, Vol.40, No.3, 1989, p.208.
28 Hans-Dietrich Genscher, “German Soviet Relations in East-West Perspective,” Article
published in Suddeutsche Zeitung, July 2, 1986, Statements and Speeches, July 10,1986, p.34.
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arms negotiations to eliminate them, created an increasingly tenuous situation.
The Soviets welcomed the CDE conference as a chance to further
denounce NATO deployment of INF. Many NATO members, including West
Germany, were panic-stricken at the thought of a Soviet walkout from current
arms control talks. Consequently, West European NATO members desperately
wanted a forum to show that East-West detente could continue in spite of
NATO’s deployment of INF forces.
The end result of the CDE conference was a set of five confidence-and
security-building measures intended to lessen the chance of military
confrontation in Europe resulting from misperception or miscalculation; to bring
more openness to European military activities; and inhibit surprise attack and
the use of force for threat or intimidation. Among these measures were:
requirements that all CDE signatories be notified in advance of certain military
activities conducted in Europe; to exchange annual schedules of military
activities; to invite observers from all participating states to certain military
activities; and provisions for verification of compliance, including an
unprecedented measure for on-site inspection on demand.29
At the CDE conference Genscher illustrated his renewed detente
offensive:
The confidence and security building measures which are the subject of
our negotiations here in Stockholm should not merely be the preliminary
stage of disarmament measures...They should also lay the foundations
for cooperative security arrangements which remove the incentive for the
use of force as well as the fear of such force
The aim is to strengthen
confidence and security by means of a set of politically binding, militarily
significant and verifiable measures which will have to be applied
throughout Europe. All involved have become increasingly aware that
confidence building is an indispensable element of a policy aimed at
detente and cooperation. Only on the basis of growing confidence
29 Carl C. Krehbiel. Confidence-and Security-Building Measures in Europe The Stockholm
Conference (Praeger: New York, 1989), p.1.
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founded on concrete measures will it be possible to make progress in
mutual cooperation and toward an accommodation in the field of security
among the participating states. Our aim is to effectively and visibly
reduce the danger of the use of military power by means of cooperative
confidence-building measures.30
When the INF debate was raging in West Germany in 1987 Genscher
again made his stance on the issue quite clear. In direct opposition to the
conservative members of the governing coalition Genscher repeatedly
announced his unqualified support for the proposals. Genscher’s FDP applied
pressure on the CDU-CSU by tacitly linking the governing coalition’s survival to
greater CDU flexibility on the INF issue.31 The position of the federal
government soon became untenable. Isolated by its allies and by public
opinion, as well as by its coalition partner, the FDP, the CDU-CSU indicated its
agreement with the INF proposals. Genscher and the FDP had prevailed over
its larger coalition partner. Genscher welcomed the early 1988 INF agreement
as a “Soviet-American contribution to detente and as the late fruits of the twintrack policy which had been intended to secure the removal of the SS-20s from
Eastern Europe.”32

Genscher’s Foreign Policy
The INF issue demonstrated the increasing inseparability of arms control
and eastern diplomacy.33 Genscher illustrated this point in a September 2,
30 Hans-Dietrich Genscher,” Speech at the CSCE Conference on Confidence and Security
Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe,” Stockholm, January 28,1986. As quoted in
Vojtech Mastny, The Helsinki Process and the Reintegration of Europe 1986-1991. (New York
University Press:New York, 1992), p.71-72.
31 Clay Clemens, “West Germany’s centre-right and arms control,” p.60.
32 William E. Paterson, “Foreign and Security Policy,” in Gordon Smith, William E. Paterson,
Peter H. Merkl, Editors, Developments in West German Politics (Duke University Press:Durham,
1989), p. 197
33 lbid.,p.61.
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1987 speech to the German Bundestag.

European peace policy in this nuclear age necessitates comprehensive
cooperation between East and West. It requires peaceful reconciliation
of interests as the outcome of an intensive, continuous dialogue.
Comparing military arsenals with each other leads us along the wrong
path, that of an arms race, if there is no comprehensive political and
security concept pointing the way from confrontation to cooperation.34
Genscher’s concept of a future cooperative security net was a broad one
grounded in his pan-European vision. It encompassed economic, political,
psychological and cultural aspects while purposefully attempting to downgrade
the necessity of a military component.
As a result of increasing cooperation, of genuine detente and of
disarmament, the military elements will lose significance in the West-East
relationship, whereas others-political, economic, cultural cooperationwili gain in importance.35
The threat of force, he argued, should eventually be replaced with
cooperation, trust, interdependence, confidence-building measures and other
aspects of cooperative security. The use of force to intimidate or threaten, and
the striving for military superiority, foster mutual insecurity, not cooperative
security. The primary vehicle for building this cooperation and interdependence
between East and West was to be the CSCE. Genscher saw the INF Treaty as
a vital step to a CSCE-based process of overcoming the East-West division:
Progress in nuclear disarmament makes the establishment of
conventional stability in Europe all the more important. We seek to
establish this stability at a low level of weapons by means of
disarmament. No state should be capable of attacking; each should be
34 Hans-Dietrich Genscher, “Elimination of intermediate Nuclear forces,” Speech made before
the German Bundestag in Bonn, September 2, 1987, Statements and Speeches, p.2.
35 Hans-Dietrich Genscher, “The German Responsibility for Peace in Europe,” speech at the
School for Advanced International Studies, The Johns Hopkins University Bologna Center,
Bologna, Italy, October 3,1988, Statements and Speeches, October 4,1988, p.3.

20
able only to defend. The strategy proposed by the West for this purpose
will strengthen security in every single part of Europe... It is time to draw
up the blueprint for a peaceful order in Europe. That requires more than
just disarmament. To prevent any kind of war in Europe forever and to
secure lasting peace, to gain more stability through political dialogue and
cooperation in all fields, to bring people closer together again in divided
Europe, and hence in divided Germany, too, by means of unhindered
contacts and free exchanges of opinion and information, to implement
human rights - these aims are the core of the political philosophy
underlying the Helsinki Final Act.36
Genscher pushed for both the INF Treaty and CSCE as parts of a cooperative
security structure that would incorporate all of Europe.
Genscher’s foreign policy often consisted of balancing several
overlapping and inconsistent policies. The NATO double-track decision
presented such a situation. Initially, Genscher was forced to sacrifice detente
for defense policy. The necessity of preserving the Western alliance took
precedence over the pursuit of detente. However, even in the face of
deteriorating superpower relations and a poor international climate, Genscher
did not forsake the CSCE process. Coupled with the CDE process, Genscher
used the CSCE to fill the gap in East-West dialogue created by the INF debate.
The CSCE process was not simply a token effort during this period. It produced
the CDE agreement on confidence and security building measures which
sought to lessen the chances for military mishaps between East and West.
While Genscher was forced to downplay the detente track of his foreign policy,
he nevertheless was able to pursue his vision of pan-European cooperation
through the CSCE process.
Genscher’s vision of a pan-European cooperative security arrangement
began to take definitive shape with the 1985 ascension to power of Mikhail

36 Hans-Dietrich Genscher, “Towards a Strategy for Progress,” speech at the meeting of the
Institute for East-West Security Studies, St. Paul Minnesota, October 10,1987, Statements and
Speeches, October 10, 1987, p.6.
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Gorbachev in the Soviet Union. Genscher saw quite early on that Gorbachev’s
“new thinking” offered the prospect of fulfilling his concept of cooperative
security and that this in turn might allow for the division of Europe to be
overcome peacefully.

CHA PTER III
G enscher and G orbachev

With the ascension of Mikhail Gorbachev as General Secretary of the
Soviet Union, Genscher found the perfect partner with whom to bring his panEuropean vision to fruition. However, the new General Secretary was not a
willing partner from the start of his tenure in office. Gorbachev needed to
consolidate his power at home before projecting radical change abroad.
Gorbachev did not assume office feeling strong domestic pressure to alter the
USSR’s international situation. He tended to stress domestic improvement to
achieve foreign policy success, not the opposite, and initially he continued the
same foreign policies as his predecessor Leonid Brezhnev.37
During his first year in office Gorbachev thus also continued Brezhnev’s
policy of isolating the Federal Republic in international relations. However, as
early as the spring of 1985 Gorbachev began calling for renewed momentum in
detente. In a speech marking the fortieth anniversary of the Soviet victory over
Germany, Gorbachev stated:
W e believe that the process of detente should be revived. This does not
mean, however, a simple return to what was achieved in the 1970’s. It is
necessary to strive for something much greater. From our point of view,
detente is not an end goal of politics. It is needed, but only as a
transitional stage from a world cluttered with arms to a reliable and

37 John Van Oudenaren, Detente in Europe: The Soviet Union and the West since 1953
(Duke University Press:Durham, 1991), p.354.
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comprehensive system of international security.38
Throughout the period of cool West German-Soviet relations, Genscher
had attempted to ease the relationship through endless diplomatic visits to the
Soviet Union in addition to repeated calls for renewed detente. Genscher’s
attempts at reconciliation with the Soviets were met with skepticism by both
German and NATO leaders. Genscher’s famous call for Western leaders to
“take Gorbachev at his word” was almost universally seen as premature and
misguided. However, subsequent events were to prove Genscher’s gesture
prescient. The late 1980’s saw the Soviet Union begin to place a high priority
on improving West German-Soviet relations. The conclusion of the INF
agreement and the re-establishment of cordial relations between the
superpowers removed the final obstacles for renewed good relations between
the FRG and the Soviet Union.

Genscher’s Foreign Policy
A major contributing factor to the improvement in relations was
Genscher’s attempt to define a new Western policy towards Gorbachev and the
USSR. Following the reelection of the CDU-CSU-FDP coalition and
Gorbachev’s performance at the January 1987 Central Committee plenum in
Moscow, Genscher distinguished himself as one of the first western diplomats to
advocate “taking Gorbachev at his word” and test the Soviet leader’s
willingness to pursue new East-West agreements.39 Genscher outlined this
new policy on February 1, 1987 in his oft-quoted speech in Davos, Switzerland.

38 Pravda, May 9,1985
39 Ronald D. Asmus, “Bonn’s Ostpolitik in the Age of Gorbachev,” in James A. Cooney,
Wolfgang-Uwe Friedrich, and Gerald R. Kleinfeld’s German-American Relations Yearbook 1
(Campus Verlag: Frankfurt, 1989, p.83.
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In Davos, Genscher described his policy prescription for western
relations with Gorbachev. He argued that Gorbachev’s “new thinking”
represented a recognition that the policies of military buildup pursued by
Brezhnev had only resulted in a ruinous arms race. The end results of these
policies had been the rearming of the West and the neglect of the Soviet
economy. As a consequence of these actions the Soviets were making no
headway in the development of modern technologies. The Soviets were “in
danger of remaining bogged down in the industrial age as the world around
advances into the information age.” In order to modernize the economy,
Gorbachev needed to promote peaceful external relations to end the arms race,
and open up Soviet society to the world.40
In the Davos speech, Genscher offered some proof of his assertions
concerning the new Soviet General Secretary. In the area of arms control, he
noted that the Soviet leader had stated that he was ready to accept drastic cuts
in strategic nuclear systems and a zero option for INF forces in Europe.
Genscher further noted that at the Stockholm Conference on Confidence and
Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe that Gorbachev had
“broken with the principle, hitherto sacrosanct to the Soviet Union, that on-site
inspections for the purpose of verifying compliance with arms-control
agreements would not be tolerated.”
In addition, Genscher pointed out the shift in ideological tone of the
Gorbachev regime, a shift that he took pains to point out “is consistent with
responsible Western policies:”
Whereas Mr. Brezhnev still maintained that the correlation of forces in the
world was constantly shifting in favor of Moscow, Mr. Gorbachev has
40 Hans-Dietrich Genscher, “Taking Gorbachev at his Word,” speech at the World Economic
Forum, Davos, Switzerland, February 1,1987, Statements and Speeches, February 6,1987.
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made no link between the concept of peaceful coexistence of states on
the one hand and the class struggle and ideological challenge to the
West on the other. Mr. Gorbachev has shifted the emphasis onto new
subjects. He refers time and time again to the interdependence of
nations, he speaks of environmental problems and other global issues
which make the world dependent upon cooperation for survival.41
Gorbachev’s “new thinking” offered Genscher the prospect of a radically
new concept of security in Europe, a cooperative structure that meant that the
division of Europe might finally be overcome peacefully. Genscher quoted
Gorbachev with approval on the question of international security in the Davos
speech:
The nature of modern weapons is such that no single country can hope
to protect itself by means of military technology, by building up a
defensive shield, no matter how powerful. The task of maintaining
security assumes more and more a political character. Hence it can only
be accomplished by political means....With regard to relations between
the Soviet Union and the United States, security can only be a mutual
state, and with regard to international relations as a whole, it can only be
of a general nature. The ultimate wisdom lies not in thinking solely of
oneself, and worse still to the detriment of the other side. All must feel
they have the same degree of security 42
Throughout the speech Genscher argued for a new, more flexible
Western approach to the Soviet Union that sought to evaluate Gorbachev
without prejudice.
If there should be a chance today that, after 40 years of East-West
confrontation, there could be a turning point in East-West relations, it
would be a mistake of historic dimensions for the West to let this chance
slip just because it cannot escape from a way of thinking which invariably
expects the worst from the Soviet Union.43

41 ibid., p.3.
42 Mikhail Gorbachev, as quoted in Hans-Dietrich Genscher, “Taking Gorbachev at his Word,”
43 Hans-Dietrich Genscher, Taking Gorbachev at his Word,” p.5.
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Genscher went on to provide the broad outlines of a Western policy that
would take Gorbachev and his “new policy” seriously. This approach consisted
of three tracks which would seek to “influence, expedite and shape”
developments in the Soviet Union. The first policy initiative entailed setting up
cooperative security structures in order to provide equal security for all countries
of Europe and the world. Part and parcel of the creation of these structures
would be the initiation of a comprehensive process of disarmament.
The second track consisted of economic cooperation with the East to assist the
Soviet Union in the process of modernizing its economy. The third track
consisted of tf\e West embracing the concept of “a common European edifice”
and working with the Soviets to make all of Europe a “common home” whose
inhabitants coexist peacefully and where “the division between East and West
is increasingly overcome and where human rights are respected.”44
A major theme in the Davos speech is the role Genscher accorded the
CSCE in Western dealings with the Soviet Union. After outlining his
recommendations for a three-tiered Western approach to the Soviet Union he
had this to say about the CSCE:
Disarmament aimed at stability, economic cooperation and improvement
of the human rights situation - these are the three main aspects of the
CSCE process. All these aspects are inseparably linked. Progress in
one area encourages progress in the others. A stalemate in one blocks
progress in the others, too. In full awareness of this link, the participating
states covered all three aspects in the Helsinki Final Act. It has thus
become a guide outlining the course towards a peaceful order in Europe,
in which nations with differing social and political systems can develop in
peaceful competition without fear of each other45

Genscher had become convinced that Gorbachev's foreign policy
44 ibid., p.5.
45 lbjd.,p.7.
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represented a fundamental shift in Soviet strategy and that Gorbachev’s
description of a “common European house” corresponded with his desire to
create a new European cooperative security structure.

Genscher’s Role
A few weeks after the Davos speech Genscher took the lead in sternly
reprimanding the U.S. for its apparent attempt to circumvent the 1972 U.S.Soviet Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (ABM). The U.S. was perceived as
attempting to loosen the scope of the treaty in order to test elements of the
controversial Strategic Defense Initiative. In a discussion with the U.S.
Assistant Secretary of Defense, Richard N. Perle, Genscher stated that without
prior negotiations with the Soviets, Washington should not unilaterally broaden
its interpretation of the ABM treaty.46 After the meeting, Genscher asserted that
the tone of his discussion with Perle “underscored the need to submit to careful
examination among the alliance partners the consequences of any possible
unilateral decision for...East-West relations as a whole.”47
During the INF debate in West Germany, Genscher risked an open
confrontation with Chancellor Helmut Kohl by publicly arguing the merits of
Gorbachev’s proposals for the abolition of both medium and short range missile
in Europe 48

More conservative members of the governing FDP-CDU-CSU

coalition were very reluctant to remove all short range missiles from Germany
for reasons of deterrence. By virtue of his public proclamations, Genscher
succeeded in forcing the hand of his coalition partners into adopting his pro46 William Tuohy, “U.S. Should Strictly Abide by ABM Treaty Terms, Bonn Says,” Los Angeles
Times, February 27,1987, Part 1, p8.
47 Ibid., p.8.
48 James M. Markham, “Bonn Centrist Party Gains on Arms Issue,” The New York Times, May
18, 1987, p.A3.
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Gorbachev stance.
In January of the following year Genscher undertook a four day visit to
Poland to underscore the “new dynamism” of Bonn’s relations with the
Communist nations of Eastern Europe.49 After meeting with Polish leader
General Wojciech Jaruzelski, Genscher said that the two governments had
agreed to set up working groups that would undertake to resolve differences on
security questions, financial and economic issues, and proposed treaties on
scientific, cultural and consular affairs.

Genscher told reporters after his

meeting with General Jaruzelski that “never have conditions [for East-West
relations] been so favorable as they are today.”50
In June of 1988, during a U.S.-Soviet summit in Moscow, Gorbachev
presented Ronald Reagan with the outlines of a plan for sharp reductions in
conventional forces in Europe. U.S. officials curtly rebuffed the plan as
“propaganda that did not deserve serious consideration.”51

In contrast to the

U.S. response, Genscher warmly welcomed the Soviet proposal. Genscher
stated that the proposal was “very important” and that it would serve as “a good
foundation” for further discussions between the two blocs on reducing
nonnuclear forces 52 He further asserted that “Western policy must now
recognize and use the historic opportunity inherent in the Soviet Union’s new
thinking. This calls for self-confidence and the ability to recognize and use new
developments.”53 Genscher’s statements, which were made at a conference
49 William Tuohy, “Genscher Ends Poland Trip, Hails Gains,” Los Angeles Times, January 14,
1988, Section 1, p.7.
50 Ibid., p.7.
51 Jim Hoagland, “Senior West German Backs Soviet Troop-Cut Plan,” The Washington Post,
June 12, 1988, p.A1.
52 Ibid., p.A29.
53 Ibid., p.A29.
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sponsored by the Institute for East-West studies, were seen by conference
participants as a “clear bid to expand his influence in managing the relationship
between...Eastern and Western Europe.”54 In fact, by making these statements
Genscher became the first Western leader to welcome the Soviet plan.
In October of 1988, Helmut Kohl met with Gorbachev in Moscow. The
meeting represented a major step for Genscher “in his efforts to carve the
special role he claims for West Germany in bridging the division of Europe.”55
In an article published in Die Zeit on the night of Chancellor Kohl’s departure,
Genscher stated “It is the awareness of our historical duty that prompts us
Germans to acknowledge a special responsibility for confidence building
between West and East. W e shall not evade this responsibility, and nobody can
relieve us of it.”56 The main thrust of the Die Zeit article was that Gorbachev
represented the best hope to date for a reunited Europe. Genscher described
Gorbachev’s reforms as “impressively dynamic” and further argued that the
West should make a special effort to help the Soviet leader: “The more the
Soviet reforms advance, the more the Soviet Union will be able to cooperate
with Western democracies in every respect.”57
Genscher’s pro-Gorbachev stance attracted quite a bit of criticism from
NATO allies and, in particular, the U.S. The term “Genscherism” was coined
initially in response to Genscher’s enthusiasm for Gorbachev’s arms proposal,
but it came to stand for an uncritical enthusiasm for the Soviet leader and a
willingness to help him. Genscher’s initial overtures to Gorbachev and the East

54 Ibid., p.A29.
55 Serge Schmemann, “Visit Bolsters West German’s Gorbachev Ties,” The New York Times,
October 30, 1988, p.8.
56 Ibid., p.8.
57 Ibid., p.8.
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met with mixed reactions from Western diplomats. West Germany’s attempts to
strengthen Soviet and Eastern Bloc relations were seen as economically and
pragmatically motivated. Following Genscher’s visit to Poland in early 1988
Western officials expressed ambivalence about his intentions. One diplomat
noted “The West Germans have a pragmatic foreign policy, they see that there
is much to be gained by strengthening their relations with the Eastern European
countries.”58
As Genscher’s overtures toward Gorbachev became more concrete,
criticism of his actions grew on several levels. The most common criticism was
that he attempted to “be all things to all people” and therefore could not be
trusted. Jim Hoagland, a journalist for The Washington Post, argued that the
most pressing question facing NATO was not whether to trust Gorbachev, “but
whether to trust the politically ambidextrous Genscher.”59 Critics within NATO
began to fear that Genscher, because of his foreign policy successes with the
Soviets, might be in effect a mole for the Soviets. European members of NATO
projected their fears about Germany in general onto Genscher’s actions. Talk
about Genscher’s “unreliability” within NATO circles soon led to a fear of a
German deal with the Soviets that would result in the reuniting of Germany as
Europe’s new great power.60 Helmut Kohl’s Moscow meeting with Gorbachev
was watched closely by West Germany’s allies. One diplomatic observer noted
that “The allies are always a little worried that Germans might stray off the
reservation. They know that German reunification is ultimately in the hands of
Moscow.”61
58 William Tuohy, “Genscher Ends Poland Trip, Hails Gains,”p.7.
59 Jim Hoagland, “Rhetoric From Bonn,” The Washington Post, August 18, 1988, p.A23.
60 Ibid., p.A23.
61 William Tuohy, “Hopes High For Accords During Kohl’s Trip To Moscow”, Los Angeles
Times, October 22, 1988, part 1,p.5.
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In response to these growing criticisms Genscher sought to allay any
fears that Germany had ulterior political motives in its relationship with the
Soviet Union. In October of 1988 Genscher stated:
Progress in bilateral relations will not only be to the benefit of further
* improvement of cooperation all over Europe but also to the benefit of
East-West Relations. The far-reaching projects to restructure and
modernize the Soviet economy offer many opportunities for West
Germany as the most important Soviet trade partner.62
The onslaught of criticism leveled at Genscher was swept aside in the
wake of Gorbachev’s late 1988 announcement to the United Nations that the
Soviet Union would unilaterally reduce troops in Eastern Europe, some six
divisions and 5,000 tanks. After the speech, Genscher declared his early
acceptance of the Soviet leader justified: “I personally feel vindicated in my
long-held view that the Soviet General Secretary is serious about a far-reaching
change in East-West relations through cooperation and disarmament.”63
Genscher sought to link Gorbachev’s pledge to reduce conventional
forces to the ongoing CSCE meeting in Vienna. The CSCE had been meeting
in Vienna for two years in order to set an agenda for the 1989 “conventional
stability” negotiations.64

Genscher praised Gorbachev’s initiative as a “new

chapter in the history of disarmament” that would give “new impetus” to the
Vienna talks.65 In a deliberate attempt to force NATO’s allies to adopt his line of
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63 Serge Schmemann, “Bonn Enthusiastic About Soviet Cuts,” The New York Times,
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64 The negotiations on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) began on March 6,
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thinking Genscher publicly pronounced that “progress [in Vienna] will depend
on a courageous use of the opportunities and on discarding the
faintheartedness that normally prevails among many Western observers.”66
Through his statements and actions Genscher had largely succeeded in setting
the tone of the West's relations with the East.
Genscher’s Davos speech and subsequent actions were followed by
dramatic improvements in East-West relations. The signing of the INF Treaty in
late 1987, Gorbachev’s consolidation of power at the Nineteenth CPSU party
conference in July 1988, the Soviet pledge to reduce conventional forces in
Eastern Europe, and the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan all served to
bolster Genscher’s conviction that Gorbachev was responsible for a
fundamental reorientation of Soviet policy that was unlikely to be reversed.67
Genscher had become increasingly convinced that Gorbachev’s evocation of a
“common European house” corresponded with his desire to create a new
European cooperative security structure.
Genscher’s enthusiastic support for Gorbachev demonstrated his belief
that Gorbachev represented the prospect of a dramatic enhancement of ties
between the divided halves of Europe. The accelerating pace of reform in
Eastern Europe and the rise to power of non-communist governments further
justified Genscher's approach and offered definitive proof that Gorbachev was
serious in his support for self-determination in Europe. The eventual spillover of
these events into the German Democratic Republic in 1989 and 1990 made
German unification a possibility for the first time in over forty years.

66 ibid., p.5.
67 Ronald D. Asmus, “Bonn’s Ostpofitik in the Age of Gorbachev,”p.84.

CHAPTER IV
Germ an R eu nification

For over forty years the reunification of Germany was perceived only as a
distant possibility. So distant, in fact, that the opposition party in the German
Bundestag, the Social Democrats, ceased even to speak of reunification as a
rhetorical goal of German foreign policy during the 1980’s.68 In less than twelve
months German reunification was transformed from a distant concept to a
concrete reality.
The German Democratic Republic (GDR) was long considered the most
economically and politically stable of the communist bloc countries; therefore,
the rapid disintegration of the hard-line communist government took the West by
surprise. The crumbling of the communist regime in the GDR occurred because
of several interlocking factors. Above all, massive street demonstrations and
mass emigration to the West brought the collapse of Erich Honecker’s hard-line
government in October of 1989.
Several events preceded this crisis. In August of 1989, encouraged by
Gorbachev’s policies of perestroika and glasnost, the reformist faction of the
Hungarian Communist Party dismantled its border fences with Austria. East
Germans vacationing in Hungary used the border opening to flee to West
Germany. By the end of September 1989 approximately 30,000 East Germans
had fled to the Federal

68 Constantine C. Menges, The Future of Germany and the Atlantic Alliance (AEI Press:
Washington, DC, 1991), p.85.
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Republic of Germany through Hungary and Czechoslovakia.
On October 7 ,1 9 8 9 Mikhail Gorbachev visited East Germany for the
fortieth anniversary of the communist regime. During his visit Gorbachev
implied that the Soviets had adopted a position of non-interference in East
Germany’s internal affairs. Gorbachev intimated that the Soviet soldiers
stationed in East Germany would remain in their barracks as long as any public
demonstrations were directed towards the policies of East Germany and not the
Soviet Union. The subsequent street demonstrations, coupled with massive
emigration to West Germany, forced the removal of Erich Honecker as the East
German head of state.
Attempts by the communist regime to prop up the government failed
miserably. The population's long-building dissatisfaction with the socialist
model of government had come to a head. The government collapsed in a
matter of months, in part due to the leadership’s reluctance to disband the
much-reviled Stasi or secret police and in part due to a series of scandals
involving corruption of former high-level government officials which contributed
to deepening public mistrust.
Perhaps the final straw that broke the back of the East German regime
was the leadership’s decision to open the Berlin Wall on November 9. At
seven p.m. that day East German Politburo member Gunter Schabowski told a
group of stunned reporters that East Germans could henceforth cross the border
into West Germany.69 This statement led to utter confusion within East
Germany. Civilians began massing at the Wall in central Berlin just minutes
after the announcement. Not having received any official instructions, the East
German border guards initially refused to open the border crossing. As
69 Elizabeth Pond, After the Wall: American Policy Toward Germany (“A Twentieth Century
Fund Paper,” 1990), p.7.
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tensions mounted at the Wall, border officials made the fateful decision to open
the border at around ten-thirty p.m.. Thousands of East Germans spilled through
the border and at eleven o’clock the East German government issued the
official order to open the Berlin Wall.
With the opening of the border, East Germans began to see firsthand the
tremendous difference in living standards between the two Germanys. The
political climate in East Germany quickly shifted from how to reform the East
German government to how to unify with West Germany. Talk of unification
abounded. The constant flow of East Germans westward forced the East
German government to move elections scheduled for May to March 1990. The
results of the first free elections in March underlined the overwhelming East
German desire for unity. In May 1990, West and East Germany agreed to a
treaty of economic, social and monetary union. It provided for East Germany to
adopt West German currency and to remove all existing customs barriers
between the two countries.
Economic union led to calls for rapid political union. This sentiment was
strengthened by upheaval within the East German governing coalition and by
the rapid economic downturn that occurred in East Germany following the
economic union. The date for German reunification was set for October 3 ,1 9 9 0
with all-German elections to be held on December 2 ,1 9 9 0 . Between October
third and December second, the administration of the former East Germany was
assumed by officials from Bonn, and the members of the East German
parliament sat as full members of the West German Bundestag.
The initial West German response to the 1989 events in East Germany
was Chancellor Helmut Kohl’s Ten Point Plan for Reunification, which he
announced to the Bundestag on November 2 8 ,1 9 8 9 . While the plan itself was
a relatively modest proposal, it elicited quite an outcry from the other nations of
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Europe. The plan called for the creation of a number of joint economic and
environmental commissions and it pointed to the potential of a federation
between the two states. According to the plan, federation would only have been
possible once a democratically elected government was in place in East
Germany.
Kohl saw the ten-point plan as an attempt to give the increasingly
restless East Germans the prospect of an orderly process towards reunification
while subtly putting the brakes on the situation. During his speech to the
Bundestag Kohl had also sought to reassure the rest of the European nations
as to the Federal Republic of Germany’s ongoing commitment to European
integration. Unfortunately, Kohl’s actions were almost universally
misinterpreted abroad as a purposeful acceleration rather than deceleration of
events.70 Kohl’s mistake lay in the fact that he had not given any of his
European neighbors any prior diplomatic briefing of his ten-point plan.
Consequently, they were taken by surprise by the West German proclamation.
Chancellor Kohl’s rationale for his unusual secrecy lay in the vagaries of
German domestic politics. The Chancellor wished to seize the issue of
reunification for his party in order to bolster its flagging political fortunes.
Unfortunately, Kohl’s actions backfired somewhat in the international arena.
Having the most to lose, in terms of prestige and security, the Soviets’
response to the ten-point plan was the most negative. Official Soviet rhetoric
immediately after the opening of the wall made it clear that reunification was not
part of the Soviet agenda:
Bonn should take into account that any policies considering changes in
borders would not be suitable to any government in Europe and would
cause deep distrust. A new regime has started on the East German side
70 Pond, After the Wall, p.22.

37
of the border, but the border does remain.71
Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev’s response to Kohl’s plan was to
criticize it as an attempt by West Germany to gain “selfish benefits” from the
process of change sweeping Eastern Europe. Gorbachev and Soviet Foreign
Minister Eduard Shevardnaze warned that the subject of reunification was not
an issue for current policy. Gorbachev stated his opinion of Germany’s actions
flatly: “Let us not push or force the issue. History will decide this question.”72
Soviet spokesman Gennadi Gerasimov crystallized the Soviet reaction to the
ten-point plan by stating the following: “There is not one country in Europe today
that would thirst for German Reunification because of the questions it raises for
stability. It is not on the agenda.”73
British officials were not as blunt as the Soviets, but Prime Minister
Margaret Thatcher made no secret of the British desire to see unification
postponed for as long as possible. The Prime Minister envisioned a waiting
period of some ten or fifteen years 74 The British government was particularly
concerned about the new Germany’s membership in the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization and felt that a slower pace for unification was more likely to ensure
that Germany remained secured within the Western alliance. Both Britain and
France seized the opportunity presented by the Soviets to remind the Germans
that the victors of World W ar II still held residual four-power rights and that
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German reunification would not occur without their assent.75
The French response to unification was stronger than Britain’s as France
had the most difficult time adjusting to the new realities presented by German
unification. In addition to the psychological scars caused by its historical
relationship with Germany, France was worried that the changes brought by a
new, unified Germany would, “sweep away their Gaullist dreams of French
rather than German leadership of Europe and their comfortable assumption that
Paris could stay aloof from NATO’s military command indefinitely and still enjoy
the alliance’s protection.”76 In the face of these prospects the French leaders
were unsure of what to do. France attempted to slow down the pace of German
unification by stabilizing the GDR government and, in a reversion to nineteenth
century power politics, by reviving their ties with the Soviet Union.
The Bonn government found itself having to fend off criticism from
Poland, the Soviet Union, and France because of Kohl’s failure to include an
explicit guarantee of the Polish western boundary within the ten-point plan. The
Polish western boundary, the so-called Oder-Neisse line, is drawn through what
had been part of prewar Germany. Some members of the right wing of Kohl’s
political party, the Christian Democrats, have long refused to close the border
issue until after a formal World War II peace treaty.77 Kohl’s conspicuous
silence on the border issue caused public worry throughout Europe about the
aftermath of German reunification.
Of all the Federal Republic’s most important allies and neighbors, only
the United States endorsed the prospect of German reunification from the start.
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The U.S. was most able to call for democratic unification because of its
geographical isolation and lack of historical baggage concerning Germany.
As noted earlier, the pressure for German unification increased almost
exponentially between November 1989 and May 1990. The Germans were
fond of saying “the train of unification has left the station and there was no point
in lying down in front of the locomotive.” Indeed, since unification had
developed a momentum all its own, the question had become “when” and “how”
and was no longer “if.” The dilemma facing the German government became:
How were the Germans, in the face of widespread international uncertainty,
going to make unification palatable for the Europeans?
The most important actor in Europe was obviously the Soviet Union. If
Mikhail Gorbachev were to allow reunification, he would need to be able to sell
the loss of East Germany to the hard-line conservatives within the Soviet
Congress. In addition, the West, throughout the unification process, wanted to
take the interests of the Soviet Union into account so Moscow would not feel
insecure in post-unification Europe. Furthermore, the West wished to help
Gorbachev as much as possible so that he could continue the domestic
liberalizing reforms that were then in progress. Western diplomats referred to
their willingness to work with the Soviet Union’s security and domestic concerns
as “giving cover” to the Soviets on German unification.78
The West had a strong desire that united Germany be a member of the
NATO alliance. However, German membership of NATO was a Soviet sticking
point throughout the process of negotiation. Both sides wanted Germany “tied
down” to a greater alliance, but the Soviets preferred that United Germany be
either neutral or part of some sort of pan-European structure. The West felt that
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NATO was the only structure capable of “handling” the new Germany and
preventing a resurgence in German nationalism.

Genscher’s Foreign Policy
Throughout his tenure as Foreign Minister, Genscher always sought to
place the goal of German reunification within the context of pan-European
cooperation. During discussions of the future of the two Germanys, Genscher
often stated that his official policy was equivalent to that which was stated in the
“Letter on German Unity.” The letter, which was presented to the Soviets by the
Federal Government of West Germany after the signing of the Treaty of Moscow
in 1971, stated that the long-term goal of Germany is and always will be “to work
for a state of peace in Europe in which the German nation will regain its unity
through free self-determination.”79 Writing in 1982, Genscher restated the
Federal Republic’s commitment to the principles of the “Letter on German Unity”
while reaffirming West Germany’s commitment to pursuing that unity within a
broader European context.
It should be obvious to all our allies that no responsible politician in the
Federal Republic cherishes the illusion that it could seek to attain the
indelible long-term goal of regaining German unity by pursuing a
national policy of going it alone. Rather, the Alliance and a joint Alliance
policy for a peace order encompassing the whole of Europe are the
prerequisites for attaining this goal.80
During the events of 1989 in Eastern Europe, when German reunification
first became a real possibility, Genscher maintained his stance that German
unity would have to be embedded in a process of European integration. During
an interview with Der Spiegel in September of 1989, Genscher was queried
79 Genscher, “Toward an Overall Western Strategy,” p.44.
80 Ibid., p.44.
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about the possibility of German unification taking place within the European
development process. Genscher responded:
...our national interests are embedded in European interests. Any
attempt to go it alone would lead us very quickly into dangerous isolation.
It would create new instabilities in Europe, and we would thus neglect
our responsibility to help maintain peace in Europe.81
Genscher also sought to reconcile the German commitment to further
integration of the European Community with his commitment to greater panEuropean cooperation through the CSCE. To Genscher, German membership
in the EC served to promote both the German reunification process and the
CSCE process. In an article published in Die Zeit in October, 1988, Genscher
referred to the complementarity of the EC, CSCE and possible German
reunification by stating, "Everything that brings Europeans closer together does
the same thing for Germans - that is the whole of Europe."82 Genscher went on
to elaborate upon the role of the EC in the context of greater pan-European
cooperation:
The European Community is at present the most advanced form of
coexistence of sovereign countries...This European Community is not the
whole of Europe, but it is a central element of Europe's present and
future structure. The dynamic development of the European community
holds out great prospects for East-West relations.
As the pace of unification quickened Genscher repeated his call for
unification embedded within a European framework. In a February 1990
speech at a conference in Potsdam, Genscher presented his method of fitting
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the process of German unification to the requirements of the European
community through the institutionalization of the CSCE process.
The two German states are called upon to provide not only a German, but
also a European answer to the quest for national unity. The aim is to
create a European framework in which the Germans can come together.
The breathtaking pace of developments everywhere in Europe, but
especially in the GDR, prompts many people to ask what is the
foundation and framework for those developments. It is the Helsinki Final
Act. The CSCE process must now come fully to bear. This requires that
the signatories of the Final Act achieve a partnership for stability
throughout Europe in political, economic and security terms. The basis
for such a partnership for stability is also in the Helsinki Final Act and the
CSCE process.
The CSCE process must become the Magna Carta of a stable European
order, based on human rights and fundamental freedoms. The Helsinki
Final Act gave the participating states a binding code of conduct for
peaceful relations among them. It made the East-West conflict
manageable and mitigated its consequences for the people. Today the
CSCE is acquiring a new dimension: it must chart the course for
overcoming the unnatural division of our continent. Following
antagonism and then a modus vivendi, the third phase is now beginning,
in which Europe will find its unity.83
In addition to his proclamations concerning the role of the CSCE in a
new Europe, Genscher outlined ten new pan-European institutions and
structures at the Potsdam conference which he considered necessary for
cooperation and security reasons:
-A n institution to co-ordinate East-West economic co-operation. The
European Development Bank must also be seen in this context.
- A pan-European institution for the protection of human rights. The
application of the Council of Europe’s Human Rights Convention to the
whole of Europe suggests itself.
- A centre for the creation of a European legal area aimed at legal
harmonization.
- A European environmental agency.
-Extension of European Scientific Co-operation Project (EUREKA) co83 Hans-Dietrich Genscher, "German responsibility for a peaceful order in Europe,” in Adam
Daniel Rotfeld and Walther Stutzle ed., Germany and Europe in Transition (Oxford University
Press: New York, 1991), p.20-21.
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operation to the whole of Europe.
-Collaboration between the European Space Agency (ESA) and
corresponding Eastern institutions.
- A centre to develop European telecommunications.
- A centre to develop European transport infrastructure and policy.
- A European verification centre.
- A European conflict management centre.
To Keep the CSCE process moving, one might also set up a council of
foreign ministers of the CSCE countries, which would meet at regular
intervals....It is essential that by deepening and reinforcing the CSCE
process, all participating states are prepared to create a framework of
stability and network of security for foreseeable and unforeseeable
developments in Europe.84
Genscher kept the concepts of the “Europeanization” of Germany and the
institutionalization of the CSCE process at the forefront of his rhetoric during the
process of reunification. Genscher had considerable success in realizing these
aims.

Genscher’s Role
During the events of 1989 in Eastern Europe Genscher’s policies of
rapprochement and cooperation towards the East began to pay dividends. On
September 3 0 ,1 9 89 , East Germans who had been occupying the West German
embassies in Prague and Warsaw were allowed to emigrate to West Germany.
East Germany had previously refused to allow the emigration of some 3,500
refugees who had been living on the embassy grounds for as long as eleven
weeks. East Germany’s shift in position was attributed to a face-saving solution
Genscher offered to the East Germans.
While attending the United Nations General Assembly meeting in late
September, Genscher met with Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnaze
and East German Foreign Minister Oskar Fischer. In his meeting with Fischer,
84 Ibid., p.26-27.
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Genscher discussed his proposal to send the refugees out of the embassies via
East Germany, thereby allowing the East Germans to expel their citizens
formally and to claim that their laws against “fleeing the republic” were
unbroken.85 In his meeting with Shevardnaze, Genscher pressed his concerns
with his Soviet counterpart who agreed that “something must happen” and
consented to exert his influence on Genscher’s behalf.86 Later that day, the
East German government announced its decision to allow the departure of the
refugees.
After the November 9 opening and subsequent dismantling of the Berlin
Wall, Genscher flew to the U.S. on November 21 and presented President Bush
with a piece of the Berlin wall. Genscher took the opportunity to discuss with
Bush the U.S. position towards the upcoming Malta meetings with Soviet
President Mikhail Gorbachev. After the meeting Genscher made three basic
points which he indicated were shared by President Bush:
--It is in the western interest that the reform process in Eastern Europe
succeed, without any interference from outside.
- T h e Soviets should be assured solemnly and clearly that “we will not
draw advantages out of problems or difficulties which may even turn into
crises” during the course of the East European reform efforts.
-T h e W est accepts “the security interests of the Soviet Union” and
shares an interest with the Soviet Union in maintaining stability as the
reform process proceeds 87
Additionally, Genscher used the occasion of his meeting with Bush as an
opportunity to declare his views on German unity. When asked about the
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demonstrations for reunification in East Germany Genscher responded by
emphasizing four preconditions he felt were necessary to achieve unity:
-G erm an unity could only come about after free elections are conducted
in East Germany;
- a n actual union could only take place in a context in which Eastern and
Western Europe also drew together;
- i f Germany would be reunified it would only be on the basis of Western
values, and;
-th e re was no question of altering the two Germany’s international
boundaries established in 1945 at the close of World W ar II.88
Whereas Kohl had created international concern by presenting his tenpoint plan, Genscher sought to calm the international community by offering
some broad outlines for German unification. As noted above Kohl’s ten point
plan caught the international community off-guard and elicited quite a few
negative responses from Germany’s European neighbors. While Kohl made his
pronouncement without Genscher’s knowledge, it was up to Genscher to
handle the international fallout. On December fifth, 1989, Genscher flew to
Moscow in an attempt to reassure the Soviets about the prospect of German
reunification. Genscher assured Mikhail Gorbachev that Bonn considered the
issue of German reunification as inseparably linked to the ending of the EastWest division in Europe.89 In conversations with Eduard Shevardnaze,
Genscher was asked whether German unification was more important to his
government than European stability. Genscher replied that the Germans were
well aware of their “special responsibility for stability in Europe.” Genscher
added, ”Our national fate is incorporated into the fate of Europe. It means there
is not going to be a single separate German course. Only the growing together
88 Thomas L. Friedman, “West German Official Gives Bush Piece of Berlin Wall,” The New York
Times, November 22,1989, p.A14.
89 Michael Dobbs, “Genscher Moves to Reassure Soviets on Reunification,” The Washington
Post, December 6,1989, p. A20.
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of Europe can lead to a growing together of the two German states.”90
Genscher also took the opportunity to calm the fears of Poland that a
unified Germany would be bent on expansion of its borders. While in Moscow
Genscher insisted that Bonn recognized Germany’s eastern border with Poland.
The next day, in a radio interview, Genscher declared that West Germany would
never attempt to regain territory it lost Poland. He stated: “It is completely clear
that the Germans do not question the Polish western border--now or in the
future.”91 Genscher’s proclamations served to defuse but not to resolve the
issue. The Polish border question continued to be an irritant during ensuing
negotiations over German reunification. When Kohl’s stubbornness threatened
to cast a cloud over negotiations, Genscher broke publicly with his coalition
partner over the Chancellor’s refusal to explicitly guarantee Poland's postwar
boundary. In March of 1990 Genscher accused Kohl of domestic posturing over
the border issue and urged him to agree to an immediate joint East and West
German guarantee of the border.92 Kohl had maintained that a united Germany
would not seek to change Poland's borders, but that only the parliament of a
united Germany could guarantee those borders. This distinction was enough to
cause considerable nervousness for Poland. Genscher stated that Kohl’s
recalcitrance was endangering unification by spreading doubts about, “the
sincerity of German intentions to convince others that...we don’t want a German
Europe, but rather a European Germany.”93 The issue was eventually resolved
in July of 1990 when East and West Germany promised to guarantee the
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postwar German-Polish border.
The Polish agreement was worked out during a one day meeting of the
“two plus four” group. The “two plus four” talks became the forum for
hammering out the external aspects of German unification. Originating with the
Americans and agreed to at an East-West conference of Foreign Ministers in
Ottawa on February 13, the formula stood for the four occupying powers after
World W ar II and the two Germanys. At Genscher's insistence, “Two” preceded
“four” in the formula to stress that the Germans were on equal footing with the
four powers and were not being dictated to during the talks.
The purpose of these rotating conferences of Foreign Ministers was to
manage the concerns of all the parties involved in unification. It was decided
beforehand that the only business of the talks would be the restoration of full
sovereignty to Germany and the termination of the four powers' “rights and
responsibilities” in Germany which were left over from the Potsdam Conference
held at the close of World W ar'll.94 Genscher accepted the approach of using
only the smaller forum of “two plus four” instead of the thirty-five member CSCE
to manage reunification because it avoided a large peace conference leading
to a World War II peace treaty. In that scenario, Germany could have been
subject to claims for war reparations and other complications which would have
hindered the unification process.95 The final results of the talks would be
reported to the thirty-five nation summit meeting of the CSCE planned for late
1990.
With the preclusion of a large role for the CSCE in the negotiation of
German unification, Genscher strove to prevent the "two plus four" talks from
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usurping any more of the CSCE’s bailiwick. In early April, 1990, despite the
need to ease Soviet military concerns over unification, Genscher stated that the
"two plus four" talks were not the proper forum to determine the future strength
of the German army or of NATO forces on German territory.96 In the statement
Genscher acknowledged that the Soviets had legitimate security concerns and
that those concerns would have to be answered. However, Genscher argued,
discussing troop deployments in the "two plus four" talks would upset the
Vienna negotiations on reducing conventional military forces in Europe.
During the negotiations on the creation of the "two plus four" talks,
Genscher had been the most vocal proponent of a 35 nation CSCE summit.
Genscher had argued that the CSCE should meet in 1990 to give “the dramatic
developments in East and Central Europe a stable framework.”97 Genscher
used the opportunity provided by his support for the Vienna negotiations to
promote the CSCE as “the framework for creating new institutions to
accommodate the political changes sweeping Europe.” He stated that this
framework might include regular meetings of the foreign ministers of the CSCE
countries, expanding the Council of Europe’s Court of Human Rights to include
all CSCE signatories, and creating new organizations for the protection of
minority rights and for crisis management of political disputes in Europe.98
As noted above, the Soviet domestic situation required “giving cover” to
Moscow. The “two plus four” talks were threatened by the Soviet insistence that
united Germany not be a member of NATO. The first Western official to strike a
workable balance between “giving cover” to the Soviets and NATO membership
96 John M. Goshko, “Genscher Would Limit Troop Talks,” The Washington Post, April 5,
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was Genscher. The idea that Genscher proposed was soon adopted as
NATO’s official position and became universally known as the “Genscher Plan.”
Genscher believed Gorbachev needed to avoid the appearance of
having lost the Cold War. Concurrently, Genscher believed that unification had
to occur within the framework of European integration without compromising
NATO and the Americans. To that end Genscher sought to alter NATO’s
function so that it would be less threatening to the Soviets. On May 3 1 ,1 9 9 0
Genscher declared that full NATO membership for a reunified Germany was not
a cause for worry for the USSR because the Alliance would “appear in a new
light” in which it would no longer confront the Warsaw Pact, but rather cooperate
on issues of security." In effect, Genscher urged Gorbachev to be patient while
the U.S. and Europe brought NATO into line with a dramatically restructured
Europe. With the metamorphosis of the NATO alliance, Genscher argued,
German membership would be much less of a strategic setback for the Soviets.
The Genscher Plan was an attempt to balance the Soviets' domestic and
international concerns with the interests of Germany and the Western alliance.
Specifically, the plan stipulated that NATO would agree not to advance its
troops or nuclear weapons onto the territory of the German Democratic
Republic. For a period of several years the FRG also would not station its forces
assigned to NATO to that area. Further, the USSR, which was having difficulty
housing soldiers returning from Eastern Europe, would be able to keep its
■/

troops stationed in the GDR for a transitional period of three to four years.100
Additionally, as noted above, Genscher’s compromise included a “kinder,
gentler” NATO that would change from being a military adversary to a vehicle
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for cooperative security.101 Genscher strongly repeated his commitment to
developing German unity within a European framework. He stated that unity
would be a declaration that guaranteed, not threatened, the borders of all of
Germany’s neighbors. Genscher clearly gave priority to the European
Community and the CSCE as the framework for a new European security
order.102
On July 6 Genscher’s counsel of patience to the Soviets on the issue of
NATO membership came to fruition. A NATO summit held in London declared
that the USSR was no longer an adversary and invited Gorbachev to address
the meeting. The London Declaration, the final document of that summit,
spelled out the new definition of NATO’s role as a guarantor of peace and
stability in Europe. The declaration reflected the new, more political role that
Genscher had outlined in the Genscher Plan. The principles for the new
“kinder, gentler” NATO outlined in the London Declaration included the
following elements:
-transform the East-West relationship from one of confrontation to one of
cooperation;
-transform the character of NATO’s conventional defense both through
CFE (conventional forces in Europe) reduction and through a new
strategy of “reduced forward presence” to replace that of forward
defense; this would include reorganizing NATO troops into multinational
corps, limiting their offensive capability and setting limits on the number
of German forces;
-m odify NATO nuclear strategy away from flexible response to a view of
nuclear weapons as a last resort; offer to negotiate on SNF (short range
nuclear forces) and to eliminate all nuclear artillery shells from Europe if
the Soviets do the same;
-support the strengthening and institutionalization of the CSCE.103
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With the pledge to transform NATO, one of the last stumbling blocks to
Soviet acquiescence was removed. Kohl had agreed to a limit on the size of
the unified Germany's armed forces at the London Declaration. Prior to the
NATO summit Gorbachev had scored a decisive victory over his hard-line
conservative opponents at the Party Congress in early July. Additionally, in
mid-June Gorbachev had demonstrated new flexibility on the issue of German
troops remaining in NATO. German assurances of economic assistance and
the promise of a general treaty of German-Soviet economic cooperation all
served to foster a general environment of cooperation between the two states.
This state of affairs proved amenable to Gorbachev who extended an invitation
on July 11 to meet with Kohl at his private dacha in the Caucasus mountains. It
was during this meeting that Gorbachev negotiated with Kohl the broad outlines
of German membership in NATO. Additionally, they negotiated the departure of
the 360,000 Soviet troops in the GDR. The Soviet troops were to gradually
withdraw over a period of a few years. Gorbachev had accepted the Genscher
Plan.
Genscher's commitment to the CSCE process helped pave the way for
Soviet acquiescence in the conditions of German unification. For years he had
sought to dispel any potential fear of German unification present among West
Germany’s European neighbors. When queried in 1989 about the prospects for
reunification Genscher responded by stating that if unification were ever to
occur, “any German attempt to go it alone would create a dangerous
situation.”104 Furthermore, Genscher played an extremely important role in
generating an image of a “European Germany instead of a German Europe.”
Genscher argued again and again that a gain for Germany was a gain for

104 Hans-Dietrich Genscher, “Genscher on Europe and German Reunification,” Statements
and Speeches Vol.XIl, No. 19, October 3,1989, p.2.

Europe as a whole because of Germany’s commitment to European integration
and the CSCE process.
It is only in this historic dimension that German unification will become
possible - without German neutralization: with united Germany as a
member of the European Community and of the changing Western
alliance, and through our active part in building a European system of
peace in the context of the CSCE.105
Throughout the diplomacy of unification process, Genscher reiterated his
belief that the Helsinki Final Act had given participant states a code of conduct
for their peaceful coexistence. Germany wished only to reinforce the principles
of the Final Act by strengthening the CSCE process. Through this approach
Genscher sought to create a European framework in which to embed German
unification and thereby assure Bonn’s European neighbors of their security
interests. To this end Genscher forcefully lobbied the United States and the
other members of NATO to offer to the Soviets a pan-European security council
that would assure them a voice in European affairs even after their troops had
left Eastern Europe.106
The U.S. initially adopted a wary approach to Genscher’s entreaties for
the strengthening of the CSCE. The U.S. had often interpreted Genscher’s
enthusiasm for CSCE as an attempt to replace the NATO alliance with some
vague notion of collective security. In addition, the Helsinki Final Act in 1975
had originally been a topic of heated ideological debate in the United States.
However, by 1990 the U.S. administration had come to recognize the
accomplishments of the CSCE process on the issues of borders and human
rights, although the administration was still skeptical about its potential in the
105 Hans-Dietrich Genscher, “We want a European Germany not a German Europe," in Ulrich
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realm of European security. Elizabeth Pond demonstrates the change in the
U.S. government’s attitude toward the CSCE by detailing the role the CSCE
process played in the liberalization of Eastern Europe:
The minimal statement on human rights inserted into the Helsinki
agreement at the insistence of the West Europeans stimulated
astonishing ferment inside the closed East European regimes. A series
of ad hoc review conferences kept the spotlight on repression of
dissidents, and governments that acknowledged the legitimacy of foreign
state’s interest in their human rights performance kept releasing political
prisoners on order to avoid international criticism. This, in turn,
emboldened more citizens to discover and speak their minds.
The fateful Hungarian decisions to dismantle the barbed wire on the
Austrian border in May and not to force East German emigrants to return
to the GDR in August could be traced to the moral suasion of CSCE.
More broadly, Western assurances at Helsinki that the East-West borders
were “inviolable” (though not “unchangeable if peaceful means were
used) had allowed Solidarity to spring up and demand domestic change
in Poland without fearing exploitation of any resulting Polish crisis by
German “revanchists.” Helsinki - and the rise of the unorthodox Mikhail
Gorbachev to lead the Soviet Union - paved the way for the peaceful
revolutions of 1989 throughout Eastern Europe.
In retrospect, the Americans acknowledged the political virtues of
C S C E .107
Genscher took pains to voice his support for the continuing leading role
for NATO in Europe’s security system. Speaking before the German Bundestag
concerning the role of the CSCE in German reunification, he reaffirmed
Germany’s commitment to NATO. “W e are aware that this larger, whole [post
unification] Europe can only preserve its stability through the continuing
membership of the Unites States and Canada in the Western Alliance and
through their participation in the CSCE process.”108
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Once the Americans were assured that Genscher intended CSCE to
supplement and not supplant NATO they agreed to the strengthening and
institutionalization of CSCE. At Moscow’s request a CSCE summit was
scheduled at the end of 1990 following the completion of the two plus four talks.
The CSCE conferences were given a regular schedule and a permanent
secretariat was established. Institutionalizing the CSCE process in this manner
helped both to fulfill Genscher’s hopes for CSCE and allowed Gorbachev to sell
the loss of the GDR and Eastern Europe to his domestic skeptics.
On September 12, the last "two plus four" meeting was held in Moscow to
tie up the diplomatic loose ends. On October 3 unified Germany became a
sovereign state. On November 19, the CSCE summit in Paris met to give its
blessing to the peaceful reunification of Germany and, more broadly, Europe.
A few days prior to the Paris CSCE Summit Genscher was queried about
the role CSCE played in the unification process. The questioner pointed out
that ironically, Helsinki had originally been seen by the Soviets as a way to
cement the division of Europe and Germany. Responding to this assertion
Genscher quipped “if there hadn’t been a CSCE, we would have had to invent it
now.” On a more serious note Genscher stated that “the task was to create a
basis for change in Europe. Our expectations have been fulfilled, we are now
living in a fundamentally changed Europe.”109
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C O N C L U S IO N

Judged by his actions, Hans-Dietrich Genscher was in many respects
purely a pragmatist. Genscher’s support for the stationing of INF missiles on
German soil and his fervent pursuit of German reunification are both examples
of a statesman acting according to the primacy of his state's interest. However,
despite Genscher's preoccupation with.these pragmatic and state-centric
concerns, he did evolve a set of basic foreign policy precepts that went beyond
purely German interests. Genscher repeatedly and consistently voiced his
support for multilateral solutions to international problems. In various coalitions
and international bodies he asserted the superiority of cooperative actions that
sought to increase the number of participants in diplomatic negotiations and
cooperative security arrangements in Europe. Genscher's favorite vehicle for
the promotion of multilateralism was the CSCE.
During the early years of the INF debate, Genscher was a strong
proponent of the stationing of missiles on German soil. Despite the damage
such a move would inflict upon East-West relations, Genscher accepted the
necessity of fostering a credible nuclear deterrent in the face of an expansionist
Soviet Union:
A realistic detente policy is one that is very clear as to its limits. Detente
demands security as its foundation, and there can be no security for us
without the [NATO] Alliance and its, and therefore also our, defensive
readiness. Anyone that thinks that he can safeguard his security through
his own efforts and detente alone, would be a dangerous dreamer.110
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Throughout the often tense German-Soviet relationship that
characterized the period of the INF debate, Genscher always kept the lines of
communication open through the CSCE. Although forced to sacrifice detente
for defense policy, Genscher did not forsake the CSCE process. He used the
CSCE process to fill the gap in East-West relations created by the deployment
of INF missiles in West Germany. Additionally, the CSCE process produced the
CDE agreement on confidence and security building measures that lessened
the chances for military mishaps between East and West. Genscher used the
CSCE to sustain East-West relations despite the often acrimonious negotiations
that accompanied the early years of the INF debate.
Although Genscher adopted a defensive stance during the Brezhnev era,
he quickly altered his position on West German deployment of INF when Mikhail
Gorbachev rose to power in the Soviet Union. As noted above, Genscher was
the first Western official to advocate "taking Gorbachev at his word." Beyond a
purely rhetorical call for cooperation with the Soviet Premier, Genscher backed
up his assertions by publicly breaking with his conservative coalition partner,
the CDU-CSU, on the issue of the merits of Gorbachev’s proposal to abolish
both medium and short range missiles in Europe. For this stance, Genscher
received much criticism both at home and abroad. When Gorbachev
announced that the Soviet Union would unilaterally reduce troops in Eastern
Europe, Genscher's faith in Gorbachev was rewarded. It is this stance that
provides insight into Genscher's motivation. By calling for the West to trust
Gorbachev, Genscher was making a clear bid to manage the upcoming phase
of East-West relations. Genscher took a significant risk by supporting the Soviet
leader. The only gains he stood to receive in 1987 were improvements in
Europe's security situation and improvements in East-West relations; both of
these gains were the primary foci of the CSCE process.
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German reunification presents the most telling example of state-interest.
Obviously, reunification was of primary benefit to the West German state.
However, Genscher made it palatable for other Europeans by placing it within
the context of pan-European unification. Genscher's insistence that Germany
remain rooted in the EC and NATO, and his insistence that the CSCE play a
role in German and European unification, lent credence to his stated desire for
a "European Germany, not a German Europe." Genscher declared in May,
1990,
Rather than creating new problems for Europe, German Unification will
play a part in ensuring a new and lasting stability. We consider the
transformation of this insight of European history into a policy for
Germany and for a gradually uniting Europe to be Germany's European
mission as we approach the end of the century.111
This statement was not simply rhetoric. German reunification was potentially a
diplomatic nightmare for both East and West. The Soviets, as noted above,
worried about their security interests in post-unification Europe. Likewise, the
West's concerns centered on the destabilizing effect a large, economically
powerful, independent Germany would have upon Europe. Genscher was able
to satisfy both of these conflicting concerns. As noted above, Genscher saw the
broadening and deepening of the EC as a necessary step toward greater panEuropean cooperation. Genscher held up the EC as the most advanced form of
coexistence of sovereign countries anywhere in the world. For him, the EC was
to become the model for relations of all of Europe and Germany was to be the
driving force at its center. Additionally, Genscher addressed the West's security
concerns by flatly stating that a reunited Germany would remain a member of
NATO. For the Soviets, the transformation of the CSCE into a durable and

111 Hans-Dietrich Genscher, "Opening Remarks at the 'two-plus-four' conference in Bonn, May 5,
1990," in Statements and Speeches, Volume 13, No.11, May 8, 1990, p.2.
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effective, pan-European, collective security organization would provide the
Soviets a permanent voice in European affairs. Together, Genscher saw the
deepening and broadening of the EC and the institutionalization of the CSCE
process as the intermediate steps towards the creation of a common democratic
area throughout all of Europe. Genscher was able to satisfy the security
interests of both the East and West and bring Europe closer to his vision of unity
by embedding German unification within the CSCE process and the European
Community.
The evidence presented by these case studies points to a depiction of
Genscher as a statesman who was committed to preserving his state's interests
while maintaining a basic set of beliefs that European relations could best be
served in multilateral frameworks. During the course of his tenure in office,
Genscher transformed Germany’s relationship with Eastern Europe from one of
detente and defense to an active policy of pan-European entente.

Genscher

was able to pursue pan-European unity without compromising German interests
and his role as Foreign Minister of Germany. The CSCE process provided
Genscher with the perfect vehicle to accomplish both of these potentially
conflicting goals.
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